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evolve because of changing societal views of what constitutes “liberty”
under the clause, and that judges may recognize new liberty rights in light of
their “reasoned judgment.” In Juliana v. United States, United States District
Judge Ann Aiken invoked the “reasoned judgment” principle of substantive
due process in the Obergefell decision to conclude that there is a liberty right
to a livable climate system capable of sustaining human life. However, the
concept of evolving due process rights is contrary to the traditional view that
fundamental due process rights must be rooted in the nation’s history and
traditions. Furthermore, the evolving due process rights invoked in the
Juliana decision give judges too much discretion to invent new due process
rights and usurp the role of the legislature. By contrast, other district court
decisions have recognized that the political branches, Congress and the
Executive Branch, should decide climate change policy rather than the
federal courts. Just before this article was about to be published,1 a divided
panel of the Ninth Circuit reversed the decision of the district court and held
that the plaintiffs did not have standing to sue in the federal courts because
their claimed injuries were not redressable by an Article III court. In
particular, the panel determined that it was beyond the power of an Article
III court to order the plaintiffs’ requested remedial plan because it would
require a federal judge to make complex policy choices that the Constitution
assigns to the judgment and discretion of the executive and legislative
branches. The Ninth Circuit correctly concluded that climate change issues
are policy decisions for Congress and the President to decide, and therefore,
either the en banc Ninth Circuit or the Supreme Court should reject any
further appeals by the plaintiffs.
INTRODUCTION
In Juliana v. United States,2 the plaintiffs included a number of
young people who filed suit arguing that the United States and various federal
agencies had disrupted the Earth’s climate system by promoting burning
fossil fuels for energy, thereby allowing the release of huge amounts of
carbon dioxide (“CO2”) and other greenhouse gases (“GHGs”) such as
methane.3 The plaintiffs contended that the defendants’ actions promoting
fossil fuels and contributing to rising GHGs violated their substantive due
process rights to life, liberty, and property.4 The plaintiffs also maintained
that the defendants had violated the federal government’s common law duty
to hold certain resources in a “public trust” for present and future generations
1. This article is based in part on my prior article, Bradford C. Mank, Does the Evolving
Concept of Due Process in Obergefell Justify Judicial Regulation of Greenhouse Gases and
Climate Change?: Juliana v. United States, 52 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 855 (2018), but reflects
events in the case since August 2018.
2. 217 F. Supp. 3d 1224 (D. Or. 2016).
3. Id. at 1233.
4. Id.

2020]

JULIANA V. UNITED STATES

279

of Americans.5 In 2016, United States District Court Judge Ann Aiken of the
United States District of Oregon denied the United States government’s
motions to dismiss by concluding that the right to a stable climate system
capable of supporting human life is a fundamental substantive due process
right and, additionally, is a right under the public trust doctrine.6
In determining that the plaintiffs had a substantive due process right
to a livable climate system, Judge Aiken relied upon the Supreme Court’s
2015 decision in Obergefell v. Hodges,7 which held that same-sex marriage
is a fundamental right under the Constitution’s Due Process Clause.8 Justice
Anthony Kennedy’s majority opinion in Obergefell reasoned that the
principles of substantive due process may evolve because of changing
societal views of what constitutes “liberty” under the clause, and accordingly,
that judges may recognize new liberty rights in light of their “reasoned
judgment.”9 In Juliana, Judge Aiken applied her “reasoned judgment” to
hold that evolving principles of substantive due process in the Obergefell
decision authorized the court to establish that the plaintiffs were entitled to a
liberty right to a livable climate system capable of sustaining human life.
The Obergefell decision’s concept of evolving due process rights is
problematic in many areas of law and could have been avoided by using an
equal protection analysis instead. In his dissenting opinion in Obergefell,
Chief Justice John Roberts criticized Justice Kennedy’s concept of evolving
due process for giving judges too much discretion to strike down legislation
that they dislike.10 To avoid judicial usurpation of democratic legislative
power, Chief Justice Roberts argued for a return to determining when due
process rights are fundamental through the history and tradition analysis used
by the Supreme Court in Washington v. Glucksberg.11 Furthermore, Judge
Jeffrey Sutton of the Sixth Circuit reasoned in DeBoer v. Snyder that using
an evolving substantive due process analysis to invalidate state laws
5. Id.
6. Id. at 1234, 1250–52, 1260–63. My prior article addressed the public trust issues in
the case. Mank, supra note 1, at 879–86. Because of space limitations, this article will not
address public trust issues.
7. 135 S. Ct. 2584 (2015).
8. Juliana, 217 F. Supp. 3d at 1249–50 (discussing Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2598–99).
The Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution bars the
federal government from depriving a person of “life, liberty, or property” without “due process
of law.” Id. at 1248; see also U.S. CONST. amend. V. The same due process principles apply
to state governments under the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution. U.S.
CONST. amend. XIV; Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 147–49 (1968).
9. Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2598.
10. See generally Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2611–12, 2616–23 (Roberts, C.J.,
dissenting). See also Adam Lamparello, Justice Kennedy’s Decision in Obergefell: A Sad Day
for the Judiciary, 6 HOUS. L. REV. OFF THE REC. 45, 47–52 (2015) (criticizing Justice
Kennedy’s overly expansive due process analysis for usurping legislative authority and
transferring it to judges).
11. See Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2615–18 (discussing the identification of fundamental
rights through history and tradition in Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 720 (1997)
and similar cases).
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prohibiting same-sex marriage would have profoundly anti-democratic
implications because the same type of reasoning could be used by judges to
strike down other types of legislation.12 Based on both Chief Justice Roberts
and Judge Sutton’s criticism of evolving substantive due process, the Juliana
decision erred by inventing new due process rights to a livable climate and
usurping the role of Congress in making new laws.13 Instead of inventing new
substantive due process rights, the Obergefell Court should have followed
lower federal court decisions using a narrower equal protection analysis to
achieve the result of judicial recognition of same-sex marriage and avoided
giving judges the discretion to re-write the meaning of the Due Process
Clause.14
More appropriately, in 2018, in City of Oakland v. BP P.L.C., Judge
William Alsup of the United States District Court of the Northern District of
California granted the defendants’ motion to dismiss for failure to state a
claim regarding a public nuisance suit by the City of Oakland against the
largest oil companies with operations in the United States.15 He determined
that Congress and the Executive Branch should decide climate change policy
rather than federal courts even though he accepted the plaintiff’s argument
that the burning of fossil fuels has a major impact on the Earth’s climate.16 A
2019 district court decision in the Eastern District of Pennsylvania reached
the same conclusion.17 Additionally, Judge Alsup observed that climate
change affects other nations and that policy decisions affecting foreign
relations should be decided by the political branches rather than by the
federal courts.18
Just before this article was published, a divided panel of the Ninth
Circuit reversed the decision of the district court in Juliana and held that the
12. See DeBoer v. Snyder, 772 F.3d 388, 416–18 (6th Cir. 2014), overruled by
Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. 2584 (2015).
13. See Howard Slugh, Obergefell’s Toxic Judicial Legacy, NAT’L REV. (Apr. 10, 2017,
8:00 AM), https://www.nationalreview.com/2017/04/obergefell-judges-invent-rights/ [https:
//perma.cc/TA6J-XNEZ] (criticizing Juliana for using Obergefell’s flawed evolving due
process rationale to invent a new constitutional due process right to a stable climate).
14. See infra Part II.
15. Order Granting Motion to Dismiss Amended Complaints at 15–16, City of Oakland
vs. BP P.L.C., No. C17-06011 WHA, 2018 WL 3609055 (N.D. Cal. July 27, 2018). On July
19, 2018, Judge John Kennan of the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York
dismissed a similar lawsuit brought by the City of New York against the major oil companies.
See Opinion and Order Dismissing Amended Complaint at 3–8, 23, City of New York v. BP
P.L.C., 325 F. Supp. 3d 466, 475–76 (S.D.N.Y. 2018) (No. 18 Civ. 182 (JFK)); John Schwartz,
Judge Throws Out New York Climate Lawsuit, N.Y. TIMES (July 19, 2018), https://
www.nytimes.com/2018/07/19/climate/climate-lawsuit-new-york.html [https://perma.cc/B39
Z-NPTA].
16. Order Granting Motion to Dismiss Amended Complaints, supra note 15, at 14.
17. Clean Air Council v. United States, 362 F. Supp. 3d 237, 250–51 (E.D. Pa. 2019).
18. See id. Judge Keenan raised similar foreign policy and separation of powers
concerns in dismissing New York City’s climate suit against the major oil companies because
of their global operations and sales. See Opinion and Order Dismissing Amended Complaint,
supra note 15, at 20–23.
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plaintiffs did not have standing to sue in the federal courts because their
claimed injuries were not redressable by an Article III court.19 In particular,
the panel determined that it was beyond the power of an Article III court to
order the plaintiffs’ requested remedial plan because it would require a
federal judge to make complex policy choices that the Constitution assigns
to the judgment and discretion of the executive and legislative branches.20
The Ninth Circuit correctly concluded that climate change issues are policy
decisions for Congress and the President to decide,21 and therefore, either the
en banc Ninth Circuit or the Supreme Court should reject any further appeals
by the plaintiffs.22
Some readers may be skeptical that the current President or Congress
will be able to agree on positive steps to reduce the threat of climate change.
Positively, there is evidence that some Republican members of Congress who
had opposed taking legislative action to solve climate change issues are now
open to technological solutions to reducing carbon dioxide emissions, such
as advanced nuclear power or carbon capture technologies.23 Accordingly,
there is more hope that Congress can reach bipartisan solutions to climate
change issues.24
Part I examines Judge Aiken’s novel conclusion in Juliana that the
evolving principles of substantive due process in Obergefell permitted her to
determine that there is a liberty right to a livable climate system capable of
sustaining human life. Part I then examines the persistent and ultimately
successful efforts by the Department of Justice to convince the Ninth Circuit
to take the rare step of allowing an interlocutory appeal before the trial in the
case scheduled by Judge Aiken. Part I next discusses the briefs filed in the
Ninth Circuit by the plaintiffs and the defendant Department of Justice.
Finally, Part I addresses the Ninth Circuit’s divided panel decision denying
standing, and the dissenting decision by Judge Staton. Part II briefly critiques
the Obergefell decision’s use of evolving principles of substantive due
process to decide whether there is a constitutional right to same-sex marriage
and argues that the Obergefell court instead should have used an equal
protection approach to reach the same holding in favor of the right to samesex marriage. Then, Part II shows that Judge Aiken could not have found a
liberty right to a livable climate system capable of sustaining human life
19. See Juliana v. United States, No. 18-36082, 2020 WL 254149 at *2, *8–11 (9th Cir.
Jan. 17, 2020, rev’g Juliana v. United States, 217 F. Supp. 3d 1224 (D. Or. 2016); infra Section
I.G.
20. See Juliana, 2020 WL 254149, at*2, *8–10.
21. See Part II and Conclusion.
22. See infra Section I.G and Conclusion.
23. Mark Trumbull, GOP Warms to Idea of a Climate Change Policy, CHRISTIAN SCI.
MONITOR (May 3, 2019), https://www.csmonitor.com/Environment/2019/0503/GOP-warmsto-idea-of-a-climate-change-policy?j=175339&sfmc_sub=13808686&l=1215_HTML&u=
6188453&mid=10979696&jb=19&cmpid=ema:Weekender:20190511&src=newsletter
[https://perma.cc/QGV2-X6K3].
24. Id.
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using an equal protection analysis, as she acknowledged in the Juliana
decision. Part III and the Conclusion contend that the Juliana decision’s
approach of giving federal judges control over energy policy decisions is
inappropriate because the political branches should make such policies,
renewable energy and energy efficiency are increasingly replacing fossil
fuels that contribute to climate change, and there is hope for bipartisan
solutions to climate change.
I. JULIANA
A. Introduction to the Juliana Decision
In Juliana, the plaintiffs included a group of young persons between
the ages of eight and nineteen that the District Court referred to as the “youth
plaintiffs.”25 The age demographics of the plaintiffs were significant to Judge
Aiken because the court observed that “the majority of youth plaintiffs are
minors who cannot vote and must depend on others to protect their political
interests.”26 The plaintiffs sued the United States, then-President Obama, and
several federal executive agencies on the basis that the federal government
had known for more than fifty years that burning fossil fuels produces
significant amounts of CO2 and other GHGs that destabilize the Earth’s
climate system, and thereby, endangered the plaintiffs.27 The plaintiffs
argued that the defendants had promoted the use of fossil fuels despite their
knowledge that the resulting high levels of CO2 caused climate change and
other harmful impacts.28 The plaintiffs argued that the defendants’ actions
regarding fossil fuel burning violated the plaintiffs’ substantive due process
rights to life, liberty, and property.29 Furthermore, the plaintiffs claimed that
in order to avert an impending environmental catastrophe, they should be
entitled to declaratory relief regarding their due process and public trust
rights, and injunctive relief ordering the defendants to develop a plan to
reduce CO2 emissions.30
The defendants and certain intervenors31 moved to dismiss the action
for lack of subject matter jurisdiction and failure to state a claim.32 United
States District Court Magistrate Judge Thomas Coffin issued a Findings and
Recommendation (“F & R”) regarding the plaintiffs’ claims and
recommended that the district court deny the defendants’ motions to
25. Juliana v. United States, 217 F. Supp. 3d 1224, 1233 (D. Or. 2016).
26. Id. at 1241.
27. Id. at 1233.
28. Id.
29. Id.
30. Id.
31. Intervenors the National Association of Manufacturers, the American Fuel &
Petrochemical Manufacturers, and the American Petroleum Institute moved to dismiss on the
same grounds as the defendants. See Juliana, 217 F. Supp. 3d at 1233.
32. Id.
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dismiss.33 Judge Aiken adopted Judge Coffin’s F & R, and also denied the
defendants’ motions to dismiss.34
Judge Aiken acknowledged the ramifications of the plaintiffs’
theories by observing that “[t]his is no ordinary lawsuit.”35 Furthermore, she
stated:
This lawsuit challenges decisions defendants have made
across a vast set of topics—decisions like whether and to
what extent to regulate CO2 emissions from power plants
and vehicles, whether to permit fossil fuel extraction and
development to take place on federal lands, how much to
charge for use of those lands, whether to give tax breaks to
the fossil fuel industry, whether to subsidize or directly fund
that industry, whether to fund the construction of fossil fuel
infrastructure such as natural gas pipelines at home and
abroad, whether to permit the export and import of fossil
fuels from and to the United States, and whether to authorize
new marine coal terminal projects. Plaintiffs assert
defendants’ decisions on these topics have substantially
caused the planet to warm and the oceans to rise. They draw
a direct causal line between defendants’ policy choices and
floods, food shortages, destruction of property, species
extinction, and a host of other harms.36
Judge Aiken observed that the federal government during the Obama
Administration did not dispute that climate change was a serious threat to the
planet Earth caused by human beings.37 Judge Aiken explained that her
decision would focus on the following questions: “whether defendants are
responsible for some of the harm caused by climate change, whether
plaintiffs may challenge defendants’ climate change policy in court, and
whether this Court can direct defendants to change their policy without
running afoul of the separation of powers doctrine.”38
Magistrate Judge Coffin recommended denying the defendants’ and
intervenors’ motions to dismiss because he concluded that the plaintiffs’
public trust and due process claims were viable.39 The defendants and
intervenors objected to his recommendations and argued that the plaintiffs’
claims must be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction because the case presented
non-justiciable political questions, the plaintiffs lacked standing to sue, and
33.
34.
35.
36.
37.
38.
39.

Id.
Id. at 1234.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1234 n.3.
Id. at 1234.
Id. at 1235.

284

BELMONT LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 7:277

federal public trust claims could not be asserted against the federal
government.40 They additionally claimed that the plaintiffs had failed to state
a claim on which relief can be granted.41 This article will just address the due
process issues, but the other issues were examined in my prior article on
Juliana.42
B. Due Process Claims
The Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment to the United States
Constitution prohibits the federal government from depriving a person of
“life, liberty, or property” without “due process of law.”43 The plaintiffs in
the Juliana case alleged that the federal government defendants had violated
their due process rights by approving fossil fuel projects and promoting their
development.44 Judge Aiken acknowledged that it was clear and undisputed
that the government’s actions approving various types of fossil fuel
extraction and burning would pass rational basis review,45 so the crucial issue
in resolving the motion to dismiss was whether the plaintiffs had asserted the
violation of a fundamental right subject to strict scrutiny review.46
The Juliana decision explained that fundamental due process liberty
rights include both rights enumerated elsewhere in the United States
Constitution and rights and liberties which are either (1) “deeply rooted in
this Nation’s history and tradition” or (2) “fundamental to our scheme of
ordered liberty.”47 In Washington v. Glucksberg, the Supreme Court warned
that federal courts must “exercise the utmost care whenever . . . asked to
break new ground in this field, lest the liberty protected by the Due Process
Clause be subtly transformed into [judicial] policy preferences.”48 However,
Judge Aiken observed that the traditional cautious approach to creating new
due process rights in Glucksberg was substantially changed in Justice
Kennedy’s Obergefell decision, which recognized a new fundamental due
process right to same-sex marriage.49 The Obergefell decision gave federal
judges far more discretion to establish new fundamental due process rights
than Glucksberg’s history and tradition test.50 Justice Kennedy stated that
courts must:
40. Id.
41. Id.
42. Mank, supra note 1, at 866–70 (addressing political question issues in Juliana),
870–74 (reviewing standing issues in Juliana), 879–86 (examining public trust doctrine issues
in Juliana).
43. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
44. Juliana, 217 F. Supp. 3d at 1248.
45. Id. at 1249.
46. Id.
47. Id. (quoting McDonald v. City of Chicago, 561 U.S. 742, 767 (2010)); accord
Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 720–21 (1997).
48. Id. (quoting Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 720) (internal quotations omitted).
49. Id. (discussing Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2598 (2015)).
50. See Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2589.
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[E]xercise reasoned judgment in identifying interests of the
person so fundamental that the State must accord them its
respect . . . . History and tradition guide and discipline the
inquiry but do not set its outer boundaries . . . . When new
insight reveals discord between the Constitution’s central
protections and a received legal stricture, a claim to liberty
must be addressed.51
In his dissenting opinion in Obergefell, Chief Justice Roberts
attacked Justice Kennedy’s majority opinion for “break[ing] sharply with
decades of precedent” in effectively overruling “the importance of history
and tradition” in how the Court had defined the fundamental rights inquiry
in Glucksberg.52 He noted that “many other cases both before and after have
adopted the same approach.”53 Chief Justice Roberts reasoned that
Obergefell’s “aggressive application of substantive due process” would
provide judges too much discretion in deciding issues which properly belong
in democratic legislative decisions.54 As will be demonstrated in the
following few paragraphs, Judge Aiken’s newly created substantive due
process right to a livable environment is appropriate only under Obergefell’s
evolving approach to due process and not under Glucksberg’s narrower
history and tradition analysis.55
Relying on the “reasoned judgment” standard for fundamental due
process rights in Obergefell, Judge Aiken concluded that “I have no doubt
that the right to a climate system capable of sustaining human life is
fundamental to a free and ordered society.”56 Relating to Obergefell’s view
that “marriage is the ‘foundation of the family,’” she reasoned that “a stable
climate system [was] quite literally the foundation ‘of society, without which
there would be neither civilization nor progress.’”57 She cautioned that the
due process right to a livable and stable climate system did not mean that
plaintiffs could sue regarding “the government’s role in producing any
pollution or in causing any climate change.”58 Judge Aiken explained, “[i]n
framing the fundamental right at issue as the right to a climate system capable
of sustaining human life, I intend to strike a balance and to provide some
51. Id.
52. See id. at 2618–19 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting).
53. Id. at 2618.
54. See also Lamparello, supra note 10, at 47–52 (criticizing Justice Kennedy’s
expansive due process analysis for usurping traditional legislative authority and transferring
it to judges); infra Part II. See generally Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2611–12, 2616–23 (Roberts,
C.J., dissenting).
55. See Juliana v. United States, 217 F. Supp. 3d 1224, 1249–50 (D. Or. 2016)
(implicitly acknowledging that plaintiffs’ due process claims were viable under Obergefell’s
new expansive reading of the Due Process Clause, but not under the prior history and tradition
standard of interpretation); see also infra Part II.
56. Juliana, 217 F. Supp. 3d at 1250 (quoting Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2598).
57. Id. (quoting Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2598).
58. Id.
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protection against the constitutionalization of all environmental claims.”59
She held that a valid due process claim regarding climate change required a
plaintiff to assert that the “governmental action [was] affirmatively and
substantially damaging the climate system in a way that will cause human
deaths, shorten human lifespans, result in widespread damage to property,
threaten human food sources, and dramatically alter the planet’s
ecosystem.”60
Yet even these serious allegations would not have violated due
process under Glucksberg’s narrower history and tradition approach, and
Judge Aiken’s livable climate standard is only possible under Obergefell’s
evolving approach to substantive due process.61 In particular, courts have
traditionally avoided making the judiciary the leading policymaker on
climate change until Judge Aiken’s decision.62 For example, two recent
district decisions that are discussed below have refused to recognize a due
process right to a healthy environment.63
The Juliana decision explained that the Due Process Clause usually
does not create an affirmative duty on the part of the government to act.64
However, the court concluded that the plaintiffs had alleged sufficient facts
at the motion to dismiss stage of litigation that the government defendants
had violated the “danger creation” exception because the federal government
had possibly acted with deliberate indifference to the safety of the plaintiffs
by failing to take steps to address and ameliorate serious risks from climate
change.65 Judge Aiken summarized the plaintiffs’ allegations as follows:
Plaintiffs have alleged that defendants played a significant
role in creating the current climate crisis, that defendants
acted with full knowledge of the consequences of their
actions, and that defendants have failed to correct or mitigate
the harms they helped create in deliberate indifference to the
injuries caused by climate change.66

59. Id.
60. Id.
61. See infra Part II. See generally Juliana, 217 F. Supp. 3d at 1249–50.
62. See David Markell & J.B. Ruhl, An Empirical Assessment of Climate Change in the
Courts: A New Jurisprudence or Business as Usual?, 64 FLA. L. REV. 15, 22, 77–78, 85–86
(2012) (arguing that most court decisions have treated climate change cases as business as
usual rather than as opportunity to make new law).
63. Clean Air Council v. United States, 362 F. Supp. 3d 237, 250–51 (E.D. Pa. 2019);
Lake v. City of Southgate, No. 16-10251, 2017 WL 767879, at *3–4 (E.D. Mich. Feb. 28,
2017).
64. Juliana, 217 F. Supp. 3d at 1250–51.
65. Id. at 1251–52.
66. Id. at 1252.

2020]

JULIANA V. UNITED STATES

287

C. Judge Aiken’s Conclusions and the Future of the Case
In Juliana, Judge Aiken acknowledged that the defendants were
“correct that plaintiffs likely could not obtain the relief they seek through
citizen suits brought under the Clean Air Act, the Clean Water Act, or other
environmental laws.”67 However, she responded that existing limitations on
statutory remedies did not apply to the case because the threat of “imminent”
catastrophic climate change violated the plaintiffs’ fundamental due process
rights to life and liberty.68 Judge Aiken did not explain why she presumed
federal judges were more competent than members of Congress or the
President to address climate change issues.69
On the other hand, citing Glucksberg’s history and tradition due
process analysis, United States District Judge Nancy G. Edmunds of the
Eastern District of Michigan in her 2017 decision Lake v. City of Southgate70
determined that there was no Supreme Court or Sixth Circuit precedent
establishing a fundamental liberty interest and constitutional right to a
person’s health or freedom from bodily harm due to environmental harms,
and, therefore, concluded that there was no substantive due process right to
health or freedom from bodily harm as defined in Glucksberg.71 Judge
Edmunds cited the recent Juliana decision but implicitly disagreed with that
decision by concluding that the City of Southgate plaintiffs must rely upon
statutory protections rather than newfound constitutional “rights.”72
Judge Aiken would likely disagree with the reasoning of the City of
Southgate decision rejecting a constitutional right to health or freedom from
bodily harm stemming from environmental harms because the Juliana
decision disagreed with the defendants’ similar argument that the due process
argument for a right to a stable and livable climate should be dismissed
because it was “unprecedented” and “groundbreaking.”73 Judge Aiken
rejected the cautious approach of cases such as City of Southgate when she
observed in obiter dicta that “[f]ederal courts too often have been cautious
and overly deferential in the arena of environmental law, and the world has
suffered for it.”74 Her Juliana decision argued, “Even when a case implicates
hotly contested political issues, the judiciary must not shrink from its role as
a coequal branch of government.”75
67. Id. at 1261.
68. See id. at 1261, 1267, 1272 (assuming that plaintiffs’ allegations of imminent harm
are true at this stage of litigation).
69. See id. at 1249–50 (assuming judges have a right under the due process clause to
protect fundamental rights even if the legislature disagrees).
70. No. 16-10251, 2017 WL 767879 (E.D. Mich. Feb. 28, 2017).
71. Lake, 2017 WL 767879, at *3–4,*5 n.4 (citing Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S.
702, 720–21 (1997)).
72. See Lake, 2017 WL 767879, at *3–4, *4 n.3.
73. Juliana, 217 F. Supp. 3d at 1262.
74. Id. at 1262.
75. Id. at 1263.
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On the other hand, the District of Columbia District Court’s Alec L.
v. Jackson decision,76 the Alaska Supreme Court’s Kanuk ex rel. Kanuk v.
State, Department of Natural Resources decision,77 and the New Mexico
Court of Appeals’ Sanders-Reed ex rel. Sanders-Reed v. Martinez decision78
concluded that administrative agencies and legislatures were better equipped
than the judiciary to address climate change issues.79 Thus, these cases cast
doubt regarding the Juliana court’s conclusion that courts must solve the
problem of climate change.80 Additionally, Judge Alsup in his City of
Oakland decision dismissed a public nuisance suit against major oil
companies because he concluded that Congress and the Executive Branch
should decide climate change policy questions instead of federal courts
because these issues should be decided by the political branches.81 A 2019
district court decision reached similar conclusions.82
D. The Road to an Interlocutory Appeal in the Ninth Circuit
After Judge Aiken published her Juliana decision, the Trump
Administration pursued protracted and convoluted litigation in the Ninth
Circuit and Supreme Court to dismiss the case or to obtain an interlocutory
appeal in the Ninth Circuit.83 After the Ninth Circuit and Supreme Court
suggested that an interlocutory appeal was appropriate, Judge Aiken
reluctantly agreed to allow an interlocutory appeal in the Ninth Circuit.84
On June 9, 2017, one day after Judge Aiken denied the United States
Government’s initial request for an interlocutory appeal,85 the United States
Department of Justice (“DOJ”) filed a Ninth Circuit Petition for a Writ of
Mandamus and a Request to Stay the proceedings in the Juliana case on
behalf of the United States Government.86 The DOJ sought to dismiss the
case and to stay the District Court’s broad discovery orders that would
require the Government to provide a wide range of documents concerning
76. Alec L. v. Jackson, 863 F. Supp. 2d 11, 15–16 (D.D.C. 2012) (discussing Am. Elec.
Power Co. v. Connecticut, 564 U.S. 410, 424 (2011)), aff’d, Alec L. ex rel. Loorz v. McCarthy,
561 Fed. App’x 7, 8 (D.C. Cir. 2014)).
77. Kanuk ex rel. Kanuk v. State, Dep’t of Nat. Res., 335 P.3d 1088, 1097–99 (Alaska
2014).
78. Sanders-Reed ex rel. Sanders-Reed v. Martinez, 350 P.3d 1221, 1226–27 (N.M. Ct.
App. 2015).
79. Jackson, 863 F. Supp. 2d at 16–17 (D.D.C. 2012); Kanuk, 335 P.3d at 1097–99;
Sanders-Reed, 350 P.3d at 1226–27.
80. See supra Section I.B; infra I.E & Conclusion.
81. Order Granting Motion to Dismiss Amended Complaints at 14, City of Oakland vs.
BP P.L.C., No. C17-06011 WHA, 2018 WL 3609055 (N.D. Cal. July 27, 2018).
82. Clean Air Council v. United States, 362 F. Supp. 3d 237, 250–51 (E.D. Pa. 2019).
83. See infra Section I.F.
84. See infra Section I.F.
85. Order Denying Interlocutory Appeal at 2, Juliana v. United States, 217 F. Supp. 3d
1224 (D. Or. 2016) (No. 6:15-cv-01517-TC-AA).
86. Petition for Writ of Mandamus at 1–2, 43, Juliana v. United States, 217 F. Supp. 3d
1224 (D. Or. 2016) (No. 6:15-cv-01517-TC-AA).
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government energy policy decisions related to fossil fuels for the past fifty
years.87
After the Government filed its petition for a writ of mandamus and
stay in the Ninth Circuit, Magistrate Judge Coffin issued some rulings
preparing for a trial in the case. On June 28, 2017, he authorized the industry
intervenors to withdraw from the case over the plaintiffs’ objections.88
Furthermore, he scheduled a February 2018 trial date,89 which was
subsequently postponed until October 2018.90
On December 11, 2017, the Ninth Circuit held oral argument on
whether to stay the case and the trial date set by Judge Coffin.91 The threejudge panel hearing the case consisted of Chief Judge Sidney Thomas, Judge
Marsha Berzon, and Judge Alex Kozinski.92 On December 18, 2017, Judge
Kozinski announced his immediate retirement in the wake of alleged sexual
misconduct.93 Judge Friedland was randomly selected to replace Judge
Kozinski when the latter retired from the federal courts.94
On March 7, 2018, the Ninth Circuit denied the United States
Government’s Petition for a Writ of Mandamus without prejudice.95 The
Ninth Circuit determined that the United States Government’s petition was
premature because the Government had failed to demonstrate the
“extraordinary circumstances” required for mandamus relief when a party
asks an appellate court to review a case before the trial court proceedings
have concluded, and that the district court could address the Government’s

87. Id. at 1.
88. 9th Circuit Temporarily Pauses Youth Climate Trust Suit, INSIDE EPA (July 26,
2017), https://insideepa.com/daily-feed/9th-circuit-temporarily-pauses-youth-climate-trustsuit [https://perma.cc/2AZZ-KPH9].
89. Id.
90. Court Slates October Trial Date for Youth Climate Suit, INSIDE EPA (Apr. 13,
2018), https://insideepa.com/daily-feed/court-slates-october-trial-date-youth-climate-suit
[https://perma.cc/2AZZ-KPH9]; Kartikay Mehrotra, Justice Department Says Trump Should
Be Immune from Teens’ Climate Lawsuit, BLOOMBERG (May 10, 2018, 1:32 PM), https://
www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2018-05-10/u-s-says-suing-teens-can-t-force-trump-tofix-climate-change [https://perma.cc?n9BT-7B9F].
91. Abby Smith, Kids’ Lawsuit over Climate Change Faces Big Test in Federal Court,
BLOOMBERG BNA (Dec. 8, 2017), https://www.bloomberglaw.com/document/XDFK94PC
000000?bna_news_filter=environment-and-energy&jcsearch=BNA%25200000016027b9d2
62af6437f9e68f0001#jcite [https://perma.cc?D7LU-DQEY].
92. Id.
93. See Debra Cassens Weiss, Kozinski Announces His Immediate Retirement After
More Women Accuse Him of Sexual Misconduct, ABA J. (Dec. 18, 2017, 10:19 AM),
http://www.abajournal.com/news/article/kozinski_announces_his_immediate_retirement_aft
er_more_women_accuse_him_of [https://perma.cc?NA57-SLKX].
94. Abby Smith & Kartikay Mehrotra, Youths Defeat Trump’s Move to Kill Climate
Lawsuit, BLOOMBERG ENV’T (Mar. 7, 2018, 3:45 PM), https://bnanews.bna.com/environmentand-energy/youthsdefeattrumpsmove-to-kill-climate-lawsuit-1
[https://perma.cc/S72AJ6JT].
95. In re United States v. U.S. Dist. Court for Dist. of Or., 884 F.3d 830, 838 (9th Cir.
2018).
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concerns about the plaintiffs’ allegedly overly broad discovery requests.96
Thus, the district court could proceed to hold a trial on the plaintiffs’ claims,
but the Ninth Circuit possibly suggested that the district court should
consider narrowing the claims before it.97 Chief Judge Thomas observed that
the court of appeals was “mindful that some of the plaintiffs’ claims as
currently pleaded [were] quite broad, and some of the remedies the plaintiffs
seek may not be available as redress.”98 The Ninth Circuit further explained,
“Claims and remedies often are vastly narrowed as litigation proceeds; we
have no reason to assume this case will be any different.”99
On July 17, 2018, the DOJ filed a motion in the United States
Supreme Court seeking to stay discovery and halt the trial in the Juliana
case.100 In an order dated July 30, 2018, the Supreme Court denied the
Government’s motion without prejudice.101 However, the Court cautioned
the District Court:
The breadth of respondents’ claims is striking, however, and
the justiciability of those claims presents substantial grounds
for difference of opinion. The District Court should take
these concerns into account in assessing the burdens of
discovery and trial, as well as the desirability of a prompt
ruling on the Government’s pending dispositive motions.102
In view of the Supreme Court’s order, attorney Philip Gregory of the
Gregory Law Group, who served as co-counsel for the youth plaintiffs in the
Juliana case, praised the Court for allowing the case to go forward, but
conceded that the District Court would likely need to “promptly address
narrowing the claims so that the trial can go forward” as then scheduled on
October 29, 2018 in Eugene, Oregon.103
After the Government renewed its efforts to dismiss the case through
a petition for a writ of mandamus, on November 2, 2018, the Supreme Court
denied the Government’s request for a stay of proceedings in the district court

96. Id.; Smith & Mehrotra, supra note 94.
97. See In re United States, 884 F.3d at 838; Smith & Mehrotra, supra note 94.
98. In re United States, 884 F.3d at 837; see Smith & Mehrotra, supra note 94.
99. In re United States, 884 F.3d at 838.
100. Notice of Filing of Application to the Supreme Court for Stay at 2, Juliana v. United
States, 217 F. Supp. 3d 1224 (D. Or. July 17, 2018) (No. 6:15-cv-01517-TC); Dawn Reeves,
Trump Administration Asks Supreme Court to Stay Youth Climate Case, INSIDE EPA (July 19,
2018), https://insideepa.com/daily-news/trump-administration-asks-supreme-court-stay-yout
h-climate-case [https://perma.cc?BWS5-C95Z].
101. United States v. U.S. Dist. Court for Dist. of Or., No. 18A65, 2018 U.S. LEXIS
4112 (July 30, 2018).
102. Id.
103. Supreme Court Rejects DOJ Bid to Halt Youths’ Climate Case, INSIDE EPA (July
30, 2018), https://insideepa.com/daily-feed/supreme-court-rejects-doj-bid-halt-youths-clim
ate-case [https://perma.cc?W4SF-GNME].
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without prejudice.104 After repeating its observation from July 2018
regarding the “‘striking’ breath” of the plaintiffs’ claims, the Court noted,
“At this time, however, the Government’s petition for a writ of mandamus
does not have a ‘fair prospect’ of success in this Court because adequate relief
may be available in the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth
Circuit.”105 Justice Thomas and Justice Gorsuch would have granted the
Government’s application for a stay.106
On November 8, 2018, the Ninth Circuit decided the Government’s
renewed Motion for a Temporary Stay of the district court proceedings
pending the court of appeals consideration of the Government’s petition for
a writ of mandamus.107 The three-judge panel was the same as had denied the
Government’s similar motion in March 2018: Chief Judge Thomas, Judge
Berzon, and Judge Friedland.108 In November 2018, the panel granted the
motion for a stay in part, delaying the then-scheduled trial before Judge
Aiken’s court in Eugene, Oregon.109 Furthermore, the Ninth Circuit found
that the petition for a writ of mandamus deserved an answer from the parties
and also from the district court if it elected to file an answer or issue an
order.110 Finally, the court of appeals “requested” that the district court
“promptly resolve” the Government’s motion to reconsider its denial of the
United States’ request to certify orders for interlocutory review.111 The Ninth
Circuit cited both the Supreme Court’s July 30th and November 2nd orders
in the case, “noting that the justiciability of plaintiffs’ claims ‘presents
substantial grounds for difference of opinion.’”112
On November 21, 2018, Judge Aiken reluctantly granted the
Government’s motion to reconsider its denial of the United States’ request to
certify orders for interlocutory review in light of the Ninth Circuit’s
“extraordinary” November 8th order, as well as the Supreme Court’s July
30th and November 2nd orders in the case.113 Judge Aiken made it clear that
she would have preferred a bifurcated trial procedure dividing the trial into a
104. Order in Pending Case, In re Juliana v. United States, 217 F. Supp. 3d 1224 (D. Or.
July 17, 2018) (No. 6:15-cv-01517-TC), 586 U.S. 1–3 (Nov. 2, 2018), https://www.
supremecourt.gov/orders/courtorders/110218zr2_8ok0.pdf [https://perma.cc/3YRQ-XEZ6].
105. Id. at 2.
106. Id. at 3.
107. Order, Petition for Writ of Mandamus, United States v. USDC-ORE, Juliana v.
United States, 217 F. Supp. 3d 1224 (D. Or. July 17, 2018) (No. 6:15-cv-01517-TC) (9th Cir.
Nov. 8, 2018).
108. Id.; see In re United States v. U.S. Dist. Court for Dist. of Or., 884 F.3d 830, 838
(9th Cir. 2018).
109. Order, Petition for Writ of Mandamus, United States v. USDC-ORE, Juliana v.
United States, 217 F. Supp. 3d 1224 (D. Or. July 17, 2018) (No. 6:15-cv-01517-TC) (9th Cir.
Nov. 8, 2018).
110. Id.
111. Id.
112. Id.
113. Order, United States’ Request to Certify Orders for Interlocutory Review, 5–6,
Juliana v. United States, 217 F. Supp. 3d 1224 (D. Or. July 17, 2018) (No. 6:15-cv-01517-TC)
(D. Or. Nov. 21, 2018).
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liability phase and a remedy phase pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 42(b).114 If the district court found liability, Judge Aiken would
have allowed the Government to appeal the liability finding before the district
court proceeded to the remedy phase of the case.115 After reviewing case law
concluding that interlocutory appeals are only allowed in exceptional cases
and at the discretion of the district court, Judge Aiken observed, “This Court
stands by its prior rulings on jurisdictional and merits issues, as well as its
belief that this case would be better served by further factual development at
trial.”116 Nevertheless, she felt compelled by the Ninth Circuit’s November
8th order and the Supreme Court’s July 30th and November 2nd orders in the
case to certify the case for interlocutory appeal.117
On December 26, 2018, the Ninth Circuit in a divided two to one
panel decision granted the Government permission to take an interlocutory
appeal to that court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b).118 Chief Judge Thomas
and Judge Berzon were in the majority.119 Judge Friedland filed a dissenting
opinion because she read Judge Aiken’s order authorizing an interlocutory
appeal as actually arguing that such an appeal was inappropriate under 28
U.S.C. § 1292(b) and that the district court had only granted the order
certifying an interlocutory appeal under compulsion from statements in
orders by the Ninth Circuit and the Supreme Court, which has an element of
truth even if one thinks that an interlocutory appeal was appropriate in the
case.120 Accordingly, Judge Friedland would have allowed the case to
proceed to trial in the district court.121
E. Briefs in the Ninth Circuit
1. Government-Appellants’ Opening Brief
On February 1, 2019, the Government-Appellants filed their opening
brief.122 First, the United States argued that the plaintiffs could not establish
Article III standing, which is required for any suit in federal court, because
they asserted a “generalized grievance and not the required particularized
injury because global climate change affects everyone in the world.”123
114. Id. at 2, 5.
115. Id. at 2.
116. Id. at 3–5.
117. Id. at 5–6.
118. Order, Petition for Permission to Appeal Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b), Juliana
v. United States, 2017 F. Supp. 3d 1224 (D. Or. July 17, 2018) (No. 6:15-cv-01517-TC) (9th
Cir. Dec. 26, 2018).
119. Id.
120. Id. at 1–4.
121. Id.
122. Government-Appellants’ Opening Brief, Juliana v. United States, 9th Cir. No. 1836082 (No. 6:15-cv-01517-AA) (Feb. 1, 2019).
123. Id. at 9.

2020]

JULIANA V. UNITED STATES

293

Furthermore, the Government argued that Plaintiffs’ alleged injuries are not
redressable because “a single district judge may not (consistent with Article
III and the equitable authority of federal courts) seize control of national
energy production, energy consumption, and transportation in the ways that
would be required to implement Plaintiffs’ demanded remedies.”124 Second,
the DOJ maintained that the federal Administrative Procedure Act125 requires
the plaintiffs to file challenges to each individual energy or environmental
decision they objected to rather than bring a sweeping constitutional
challenge to every federal policy affecting climate change.126 Fourth, the
Government claimed that there is “no federal public trust doctrine that binds
the federal government. Even if such a doctrine did apply to the federal
government, any common-law federal public trust doctrine is displaced by
statute. In any event, the Atmosphere is not within any public trust”127
because “[p]ublic trust cases have historically involved state ownership of
specific types of natural resources, usually limited to submerged and
submersible lands, tidelands, and waterways.”128
This article will focus on the third issue in the Government’s brief,
whether there is a substantive due process right to a stable climate system.129
The United States argued that the district court’s invocation of a recognition
of a novel “unenumerated fundamental right” to a “climate system capable
of sustaining human life” failed to meet the traditional requirement that due
process rights must be rooted in this Nation’s history or tradition.130 The
Government argued that it was inappropriate for Judge Aiken to apply the
due process analysis used to create a personal right to same-sex marriage in
Obergefell to the quite different issue of climate change.131 The Department
of Justice reasoned:
There is, to understate the point considerably, no meaningful
analogy between a distinctly personal and circumscribed
right to same-sex marriage and a purported right to particular
climate conditions that apparently would run
indiscriminately to every individual in the United States and
the judicial recognition of which would affect every person
in this country and the world. Moreover, the climate-related
right recognized by the district court bears no relationship to
any right as “fundamental as a matter of history and
tradition” as the right to marry that the Supreme Court
124. Id.
125. 5 U.S.C. § 551 et seq. (1946); Government-Appellants’ Opening Brief, Juliana v.
United States, 9th Cir. No. 18-36082 (No. 6:15-cv-01517-AA) (Feb. 1, 2019).
126. Opening Brief, supra note 122, at 10.
127. Id. at 11.
128. Id. at 54–55.
129. Id. at 10–11, 35.
130. Id. at 35.
131. Id. at 36.
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recognized in Obergefell. Nor was Obergefell’s extension of
that right an invitation to lower courts to abandon the
cautious approach to recognizing new fundamental rights
that is demanded by the Supreme Court’s prior decisions.132
The author of this article agrees with the Government’s brief that the
constitutional right to same-sex marriage that the Supreme Court recognized
in Obergefell is quite different from Judge Aiken’s proposed right to a livable
climate system because a central focus of Justice Kennedy’s Obergefell
decision was on “correct[ing] inequalities in the institution of marriage [and]
vindicating precepts of liberty and equality under the Constitution” that have
no similar basis in addressing climate change issues.133 Professor Kenji
Yoshino has argued that the Obergefell decision should be interpreted as a
vision of liberty that he calls “antisubordination liberty” that protects
“historically subordinated groups.”134 But climate change issues do not raise
the same type of liberty and equality issues as same-sex marriage because
climate change affects all human beings and does not single out minority
groups for disproportionate harms, even if poor people may have less means
to adapt to climate change’s impacts.135
The Government’s brief emphasized that prior court decisions had
consistently rejected a constitutional right to a healthy environment and
therefore that the district court’s decision in Juliana was a radical change in
the law.136 Nor was it appropriate, according to the DOJ, for Judge Aiken’s
decision to extend the narrow state-created danger doctrine that allows courts
to act if a government official poses an imminent risk of harm to the personal
security or bodily integrity of a specific individual to an expansive doctrine
that requires the federal government to protect the entire United States
population from potential harms from climate change.137
2. Plaintiffs-Appellees’ Answering Brief
On February 1, 2019, the Plaintiff-Appellees filed their answering
brief.138 First, the plaintiffs argued that they had Article III standing because
132. Id.
133. Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2604 (2015). See generally id. at 2602–05
(emphasizing that marriage equality for same-sex couples is based upon both liberty and
equality concepts in the Constitution’s Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses).
134. Kenji Yoshino, A New Birth of Freedom?: Obergefell v. Hodges, 129 HARV. L. REV.
147, 174 (2015).
135. Mank, supra note 1, at 860, 898 (arguing that climate change affects all people rather
than singling out minority groups and hence does not raise the same liberty interests as samesex marriage or discrimination against LGBTQ individuals, although acknowledging that
climate change may raise more difficult problems for poor people than rich individuals).
136. Opening Brief, supra note 122, at 37–38.
137. Id. at 38–42.
138. Plaintiffs-Appellees’ Answering Brief, Juliana v. United States, 9th Cir. No. 1836082 (No. 6:15-cv-01517-AA) (Feb. 22, 2019).
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several of their members were suffering from personal injuries from flooding
and other natural disasters caused by climate change, that these injuries were
fairly traceable to the federal government’s affirmative promotion of fossil
fuels for energy use, and that federal courts could redress their injuries by
ordering the executive branch to take steps to reduce fossil fuel usage.139
Second, the plaintiffs contended that their right to procedural due process
under the Fifth Amendment of the United States Constitution overrode any
limitations on suits against the federal government in the Administrative
Procedure Act.140 Fourth, the plaintiffs maintained that the public trust
doctrine was binding on the federal government and that various federal
statutes and regulations, including the Clean Air Act,141 did not displace the
doctrine’s applicability to the United States Government.142 Furthermore, the
plaintiffs disagreed with the Department of Justice’s assertion that the district
court had asserted that the public trust doctrine applies to the atmosphere
when that court had not yet decided that issue and had instead concluded that
the United States’ promotion of fossil fuels had caused harm to ocean
resources that are clearly within the scope of the doctrine.143
Of central importance, the plaintiffs argued that the district court had
properly established “an unenumerated climate right underpinning other
recognized substantive due process rights” under the Constitution.144 They
argued that the district court properly found that the right “‘to a climate
system capable of sustaining human life,’ (hereinafter ‘climate right’) is both
fundamental to ordered liberty and deeply rooted in our Nation’s history and
traditions.”145 The plaintiffs contended a stable climate was a fundamental
right because the children plaintiffs and other Americans could not exercise
other fundamental rights unless they enjoyed the right to a safe environment
in which to live.146 The plaintiffs tried to demonstrate that the right to a safe
environment was recognized by political philosophers and legal theorists at
the United States’ founding in the eighteenth century as a natural right147 and,
in particular, that the Declaration of Independence and the United States
Constitution, through two of its leading authors, Thomas Jefferson and James
Madison, both future United States Presidents, recognized a natural law right
to live in a healthy environment.148 The plaintiffs maintained that the right to
a livable climate was therefore rooted in this historic tradition of a natural
right to a healthy environment.149
139. Id. at 9–32.
140. Id. at 32–40.
141. 42 U.S.C. § 7401 et seq. (1970 as amended through 1990).
142. Plaintiffs-Appellees’ Answering Brief, supra note 138, at 52–59.
143. Id. at 59–60.
144. Id. at 40.
145. Id. at 41–42 (footnotes omitted).
146. Id. at 42–50.
147. Id.
148. Id.
149. Id.
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Furthermore, the right to marry in Obergefell was fundamental to a
person’s survival just as is the plaintiffs’ proposed fundamental right to a
livable climate.150 Finally, the plaintiffs argued that they had properly
asserted a state-created danger claim because the Government had
deliberately disregarded the known risks of burning fossil fuels and the
ensuing harm to the climate and that the Government’s request for summary
judgment should be denied until the plaintiffs had the opportunity to present
evidence to support their claims.151
3. Government-Appellants’ Reply Brief
On March 8, 2019, the Government-Appellants filed their reply
brief.152 The Department of Justice continued its argument that the district
court’s creation of a fundamental right under the Due Process Clause of a
stable or livable climate was completely unlike previous fundamental rights
related to personal autonomy or dignity.153 The Government criticized the
“snippets” of quotes that the plaintiffs had assembled from the political
philosopher John Locke and two prominent framers of the Declaration of
Independence and Constitution, Presidents Thomas Jefferson and James
Madison, as failing to provide concrete examples of fundamental rights to a
healthy environment.154 The Government’s reply brief argued that even if the
plaintiffs were correct that our nation’s Framers “appreciated the natural
world,” the Framers also “appreciated many things” that are not fundamental
rights so that a snippet from Jefferson’s writings appreciating the world of
nature did not mean that there was a history and tradition of treating nature
as a fundamental right.155
The Department of Justice noted that a district court in the Eastern
District of Pennsylvania in Clean Air Council v. United States156 had recently
rejected Juliana’s due process analysis and concluded that there was no
fundamental right to a life-sustaining climate system.157 In the Clean Air
Council decision, United States District Judge Paul S. Diamond observed that
“the Juliana Court certainly contravened or ignored longstanding authority,”
finding there is no fundamental right or tradition of recognizing a due process
right to a healthy environment.158 Furthermore, the Clean Air Council
150. Id. at 48.
151. Id. at 50–54.
152. Government-Appellants’ Reply Brief, Juliana v. United States, 9th Cir. No. 1836082 (No. 6:15-cv-01517-AA) (March 8, 2019).
153. Id. at 23–24.
154. Id. at 24.
155. Id. at 24–25.
156. 362 F. Supp. 3d 237 (E.D. Pa. 2019).
157. Id. at 250–51; Defendant’s Memorandum in Support of Supplemental Motion to
Dismiss and Reply to Plaintiff’s Response, at 25, Clean Air Council v. United States, 362 F.
Supp. 3d 237 (E.D. Pa. 2019) (No. 2:17-cv-04977-PD).
158. Clean Air Council, 362 F.Supp.3d at 250–51.
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decision criticized Juliana for recognizing a “right” without apparent
limits.159 The Clean Air Council decision concluded that “Plaintiffs’
disagreement with Defendants is a policy debate best left to the political
process.”160
F. Juliana Oral Argument in the Ninth Circuit
On June 4, 2019, a three-judge panel of the Ninth Circuit held oral
arguments in the Juliana case.161 President Barack Obama appointed all three
judges hearing the case.162 They were Judge Mary Helen Murguia, appointed
in 2011; Judge Andrew Hurwitz, appointed in 2012; and Judge Josephine
Stanton of the United States District Court for the Central District of
California, who was appointed in 2010 and was sitting on the panel by
designation.163
The three-judge panel appeared sympathetic to the plaintiffs’
arguments that burning fossil fuels was causing significant climate change
harms and that the federal government ought to do more to reduce the
Nation’s use of fossil fuels for energy, but the judges struggled with whether
courts had the authority to impose broad policy changes on the executive
branch.164 Judge Hurwitz questioned whether the court could broadly
intervene even if Congress and the president appeared to be failing to address
real harms from climate change and asked the plaintiffs’ attorney, Julia
Olson, whether the plaintiffs must instead challenge individual government
actions such as approving fossil fuel leases.165 Olson answered that the Fifth
Amendment’s Due Process Clause allowed the plaintiffs to seek broad relief
and, therefore, that the plaintiffs were not limited to individual suits about
discrete government actions under the Administrative Procedure Act.166 In
response, Jeffrey Clark, the DOJ’s assistant attorney general for environment
and natural resources, argued that separation of powers principles barred
159. Id. at 251.
160. Id.
161. Dawn Reeves, 9th Circuit Poised To Hear Early DOJ Appeal Of Youth Climate
Lawsuit, INSIDE EPA (June 3, 2019), https://insideepa.com/daily-news/9th-circuit-poisedhear-early-doj-appeal-youth-climate-lawsuit [https://perma.cc/3N64-AYPG].
162. Id.
163. Id.
164. Dawn Reeves, Judges Appear Sympathetic To Youth Climate Case But Query
Jurisdiction, INSIDE EPA (June 4, 2019), https://insideepa.com/daily-news/judges-appearsympathetic-youth-climate-case-query-jurisdiction [https://perma.cc/PC2M-5GWL]; Abby
Smith, Kids’ Climate Claims ‘Compelling,’ But Judges Question Court’s Role, BLOOMBERG
L. ENV’T & ENERGY REP. (June 5, 2019, 10:52 AM), https://www.bloomberglaw.com/
document/XA05UTG8000000?bna_news_filter=environment-and-energy&jcsearch=BNA%
25200000016b2363d5bea57be7efe4630000#jcite [https://perma.cc/5JV9-2FNU].
165. Reeves, supra note 164; see also Smith, supra note 164 (reporting Jeffrey Clark
argued that it was inappropriate under the separation of powers for judges to make broad
policy decisions that amount to a takeover of the government and instead that the plaintiffs
should file challenges to individual agency actions).
166. Reeves, supra note 164; see also Smith, supra note 164.
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federal courts from making broad policy decisions that are within the purview
of the political branches, but instead the plaintiffs had the right under the
APA to challenge individual government actions that might affect climate
change.167
According to one reporter, Judge Murguia appeared during the oral
argument to be the judge on the panel most favorable to the government’s
argument.168 By contrast, the same reporter thought that Judges Hurwitz and
Stanton were more sympathetic to the plaintiffs’ arguments, but were
concerned whether recognizing a constitutional right to a stable climate was
too radical a break with existing precedent.169 Professor Sean Hecht at UCLA
Law School suggested that the three-judge panel did not give a clear
indication of how they would decide the case,170 and there is also the
possibility that the case will be appealed to the Supreme Court.171
Accordingly, it may take a long time before the case is finally decided.172
G. The Ninth Circuit’s Decision
On January 17, 2020, a divided panel of the Ninth Circuit reversed
the decision of the district court in Juliana and held that the plaintiffs did not
have standing to sue in the federal courts because their claimed injuries were
not redressable by an Article III court.173 Judge Hurwitz wrote the majority
opinion and was joined by Judge Murguia.174 Judge Staton wrote a dissenting
opinion arguing that there was a constitutional right for judges to act if the
political branches through action or inaction were causing the destruction of
the United States and that the climate change crisis qualified as an emergency
justifying judicial action.175 Because the Ninth Circuit’s decision was issued
just prior to this article’s publication, the author will only briefly describe the
decision; a full discussion will have to wait until another publication.

167. Reeves, supra note 164.
168. Id.
169. Id.
170. Julia Rosen, Lawyers Are Optimistic That the Youths’ Climate Change Lawsuit Will
Go to Trial, L.A. TIMES (June 4, 2019, 8:02 PM), https://www.latimes.com/science/la-sciyouth-climate-trial-juliana-court-20190604-story.html [https://perma.cc/5DAP-W8BR]
(reporting “others said the judges didn’t give any clear sign as to which way they were leaning.
‘They were tough on both sides,’ said Sean Hecht, a law professor at UCLA.”).
171. Geoff Dembicki, Inside the Courtroom Where Teens Are Suing the Government
Over the Climate Crisis, VICE (June 5, 2019, 3:50 AM), https://www.vice.com/amp/en_us/
article/xwn5vq/juliana-v-united-states-arguments-heard-in-oregon [https://perma.cc/E52V66JX].
172. Id.
173. See Juliana v. United States, No. 18-36082, 2020 WL 254149, *8–11 (9th Cir.
2020), rev’g Juliana v. United States, 217 F. Supp. 3d 1224 (D. Or. 2016); infra Section I.G.
174. Juliana, 2020 WL 254149, at *1–11.
175. Id. at *1–11.
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The majority decision was quite favorable to the plaintiffs in many
respects, which will be discussed below.176 Ultimately, however, the panel
majority concluded that it was beyond the authority of an Article III judge to
order the plaintiffs’ requested remedial plan because it would require a
federal court to make complex policy choices that the Constitution assigns to
the judgment and discretion of the executive and legislative branches.177 As
discussed in Part II, the Ninth Circuit could have instead concluded that the
Due Process Clause does not create a substantive right to a stable climate.178
Yet the Ninth Circuit through its redressability analysis came to the same
conclusion, although by a somewhat different legal argument, as the author
in determining that climate change issues are policy decisions for Congress
and the President to decide.179 Accordingly, both the en banc Ninth Circuit
or the Supreme Court should reject any further appeals by the plaintiffs, who
might be worse off if the Supreme Court or the en banc Ninth Circuit writes
an even less favorable decision that could bar future climate suits more
clearly than the Ninth Circuit’s panel decision.180
The Ninth Circuit panel decision in Juliana made several favorable
conclusions in favor of the plaintiffs. First, the court determined that “[a]
substantial evidentiary record documents that the federal government has
long promoted fossil fuel use despite knowing that it can cause catastrophic
climate change, and that failure to change existing policy may hasten an
environmental apocalypse.”181 Second, disagreeing with the Department of
Justice, the Ninth Circuit concluded that the APA does not bar all
constitutional claims and, therefore, that the plaintiffs could potentially raise
constitutional claims outside of the APA’s boundaries.182
Additionally, the government contended that “the plaintiffs lack
Article III standing to pursue their constitutional claims.”183 The Ninth
Circuit concluded that the plaintiffs had met the injury and causation prongs
of the standing test, but that the plaintiffs’ claims were not redressable by
Article III federal courts.184 First, the court found that “[a]t least some
plaintiffs claim concrete and particularized injuries” because of such issues
as water shortages or flooding that harmed individual plaintiffs and that these
176. See Jonathan Adler, Ninth Circuit Dismisses Kids Climate Case for Lack of Standing
(Updated), REASON (Jan. 17, 2020), https://reason.com/2020/01/17/ninth-circuit-dismisseskids-climate-case-for-lack-of-standing/ [https://perma.cc/QTP5-9NHT] (arguing that the
Ninth Circuit majority decision in Juliana was favorable to the plaintiffs in many ways).
177. See Juliana, 2020 WL 254149, at *8–10.
178. See infra Part II.
179. See infra Part II and Conclusion.
180. See infra Section I.G and Conclusion; Adler, supra note 176 (arguing that the
plaintiffs are foolish to appeal because the Supreme Court or the en banc Ninth Circuit will
write an even less favorable decision that could bar future climate suits more clearly than the
Ninth Circuit’s panel decision).
181. Juliana, 2020 WL 254149, at *2–4.
182. Id. at *4.
183. Id. at *5.
184. Id. at *5–10.
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injuries were caused by climate change.185 Furthermore, the panel determined
that several federal government policies promoting fossil fuels had
exacerbated climate change and had caused these injuries.186
The majority’s findings on the government’s responsibility for
worsening climate change, the ability of the plaintiffs to raise constitutional
claims despite the APA, and standing injury and causation were quite
favorable to the plaintiffs.187 The plaintiffs have announced that they will
appeal the panel decision to the Ninth Circuit for possible en banc review.188
Professor Jonathan Adler argues that the plaintiffs should probably not
appeal the decision to the en banc Ninth Circuit or Supreme Court because
either court might reverse some of the panel’s rulings in favor of the plaintiffs
and, therefore, make it harder for subsequent plaintiffs to bring climate
change suits.189 Other legal scholars and practitioners have agreed with
Adler’s analysis that the en banc Ninth Circuit is unlikely to overrule the
panel majority and that the Supreme Court would likely render a less
favorable decision than the panel majority.190
The panel majority did not decide whether there is a substantive due
process right to a stable climate capable of sustaining human life.191 The
Ninth Circuit observed that “[r]easonable jurists can disagree about whether
the asserted constitutional right exists.”192 Instead, the court focused on
whether federal courts had the authority to implement the plaintiffs’ proposed
remedies.193 The Ninth Circuit first rejected the plaintiffs’ proposed remedy
of a declaration that the United States government was violating the
Constitution because that symbolic gesture would have no practical benefit
for the plaintiffs and, therefore, could not redress their injuries.194
The majority then explained that the plaintiffs essentially sought an
injunction to force the Executive and Congress to reduce carbon emissions,
but that such a sweeping remedy would require federal courts to assert
unconstitutional powers to override the constitutional authority of the
political branches’ ability to make policy choices for better or worse.195 The
majority observed, “The plaintiffs thus seek not only to enjoin the Executive
from exercising discretionary authority expressly granted by Congress . . .
185. Id. at *5.
186. Id. at *5–6.
187. Id. at *2–6; see Adler, supra note 176.
188. See Adler, supra note 176.
189. Id.
190. Ellen M. Gilmer, Youth Climate Plaintiffs Face Continued Legal Risks After Defeat,
BLOOMBERG L. ENV’T & ENERGY REP. (Jan. 23, 2020, 4:01 AM), https://news.bloomberg
environment.com/environment-and-energy/youth-climate-plaintiffs-face-continued-legalrisks-after-defeat [https://perma.cc/TX8A-PJ4K] (reporting the views of several legal
experts).
191. Juliana, 2020 WL 254149, at *6.
192. Id.
193. Id.
194. Id.
195. Id. at *6–10.
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but also to enjoin Congress from exercising power expressly granted by the
Constitution over public lands.”196 While clearly sympathetic to the
plaintiffs’ concerns about the potentially harmful effects of climate change,
the Ninth Circuit held that federal courts do not have the authority to override
or order the energy policy choices of the political branches. 197 The court
stated:
We reluctantly conclude, however, that the plaintiffs’ case
must be made to the political branches or to the electorate at
large, the latter of which can change the composition of the
political branches through the ballot box. That the other
branches may have abdicated their responsibility to
remediate the problem does not confer on Article III courts,
no matter how well-intentioned, the ability to step into their
shoes.198
Accordingly, the majority reversed the decision of the district court and
ordered it to dismiss the case for lack of standing.199
The dissenting opinion by Judge Staton argued that there is an
implied constitutional Due Process Clause right to preserve the “perpetuity
of the Republic” and that federal judges have the authority to recognize due
process suits to prevent “the willful dissolution of the Republic.”200
Additionally, she contended that the plaintiffs had Article III standing to sue
in federal courts in light of Massachusetts v. EPA,201 which had authorized
climate change suits by state governments against the federal government.202
Judge Staton criticized the majority for deferring to the political branches
when such deference would result in catastrophic harms from climate
change.203 Furthermore, she argued that the political question doctrine did
not bar the suit and that the district court could order meaningful relief even
if it would be infeasible for a single judicial decision to solve the entire
problem of global climate change.204
Judge Hurwitz’s majority opinion sharply criticized the reasoning in
Judge Staton’s dissenting opinion.205 Even assuming that the plaintiffs had a
constitutional right to preserve the nation’s perpetuity, the majority observed
that “we doubt that the plaintiffs would have Article III standing to enforce
196. Id. at *6.
197. Id. at *6–10.
198. Id. at *10.
199. Id. at *11.
200. Id. at *11–15 (Staton, J., dissenting).
201. Id. at *15–17 (discussing Article III standing in general and Massachusetts v. EPA,
549 U.S. 497 (2007)).
202. See Massachusetts, 497 U.S. at 517–26.
203. Juliana, 2020 WL 254149, at *18–24 (Staton, J., dissenting).
204. Id.
205. Id. at *9–10.
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them” because such a right would be general to “all citizens equally” and,
therefore, not an individual injury necessary for Article III standing.206
Additionally, Judge Hurwitz charged that “the dissent offers no metrics for
judicial determination of the level of climate change that would cause ‘the
willful dissolution of the Republic,’” and did not provide a meaningful
formula “for measuring a constitutionally acceptable ‘perceptible reduction
in the advance of climate change.’”207 Additionally, the majority noted that
the Supreme Court had never approved anything similar to Judge Staton’s
proposed perpetuity test as a basis for the judicial branch to override the
political branches.208 Judge Hurwitz cautioned that federal judges could not
solve every danger to the American nation or government, that federal judges
must respect their limited roles outlined in Article III of the U.S. Constitution,
but instead must hope that the political branches will address problems that
pose catastrophic risks to the nation such as climate change.209 Judge
Hurwitz’s decision appropriately deferred to the political branches to make
important policy decisions, even if a federal judge might be dissatisfied with
their solutions.
II. A CRITIQUE OF OBERGEFELL’S DUE PROCESS ANALYSIS
Part II criticizes Judge Aiken’s evolving due process analysis in
Juliana because it relied primarily upon the flawed Obergefell decision.210
Justice Kennedy’s theory of judges using their “reasoned judgment” to invent
new fundamental due process rights211 is profoundly anti-democratic.212
Judge Sutton has contended that “[a] principled jurisprudence of
constitutional evolution turns on evolution in society’s values, not evolution
in judges’ values.”213 He explicated in DeBoer v. Snyder, “[t]he theory of the
living constitution rests on the premise that every generation has the right to
govern itself. If that premise prevents judges from insisting on principles that
society has moved past, so too should it prevent judges from anticipating
principles that society has yet to embrace.”214
Judge Sutton cautioned that the judicial establishment of a
constitutional right to same-sex marriage would lead to other interest groups
demanding constitutional rights in numerous other areas. He inferred that
206. Id. at *9.
207. Id. at *10.
208. Id.
209. Id.
210. See Juliana v. United States, 217 F. Supp. 3d 1224, 1249–50 (D. Or. 2016)
(implicitly acknowledging that plaintiffs due process claims were viable under Obergefell’s
new expansive reading of the Due Process Clause, but not under the prior history and tradition
standard of interpretation); infra Part II.
211. Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2598 (2015).
212. See generally id. at 2616–23 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting).
213. DeBoer v. Snyder, 772 F.3d 388, 416 (6th Cir. 2014) (emphasis in original),
overruled by Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584 (2015).
214. Id.
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“[t]he more the Court innovates under the Constitution, the more plausible it
is for the Court to do still more—and the more plausible it is for other
advocates on behalf of other issues to ask the Court to innovate still more.”215
Judge Sutton warned that the judicial expansion of constitutional rights
would place judges in a legislative role and, as a consequence, deepen
political warfare over the confirmation of judges.216 Judge Aiken’s
invocation of Obergefell‘s broad “reasoned judgment” methodology217 of
creating fundamental constitutional rights demonstrates that Judge Sutton
was correct that a decision establishing a constitutional right to same-sex
marriage would encourage advocates to push for the development of
constitutional rights in other areas.218
Yet, if the Supreme Court in Obergefell had instead issued a decision
creating a constitutional right to same-sex marriage through a rational basis
test under the Equal Protection Clause, that approach would have posed less
danger of future judicial legislation than Justice Kennedy’s “reasoned
judgment” due process analysis.219 Judge Posner’s Seventh Circuit decision
in Baskin v. Bogan struck down two state statutes defining marriage as
exclusively heterosexual by applying a rational basis analysis under the
Equal Protection Clause and by deliberately avoiding the question of whether
such marriages are a fundamental right under the Due Process Clause.220
Judge Posner determined that there was no rational basis for Indiana and
Wisconsin to forbid same-sex marriage based upon tradition because there
was no evidence that authorizing same-sex marriage would change the
marriage decisions of heterosexual persons.221 Having decided that
discrimination against same-sex marriage was irrational and invalid under
the Equal Protection Clause, Judge Posner concluded that he need not address
the problem of whether same-sex marriage is a fundamental right under the
Due Process Clause.222
Judge Aiken in Juliana implicitly conceded that she could not have
applied a rational basis analysis under the Equal Protection Clause to create
a new constitutional right to a livable climate system.223 She acknowledged
that current environmental and energy statutes and regulations addressing
climate change meet a rational basis test under the Equal Protection Clause
215. Id. at 418.
216. Id.
217. See Juliana v. United States, 217 F. Supp. 3d 1224, 1249–50 (D. Or. 2016) (quoting
Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2598).
218. DeBoer, 772 F.3d at 418.
219. See Juliana, 217 F. Supp. 3d at 1249–50 (quoting Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2598).
220. See, e.g., Baskin v. Bogan, 766 F.3d 648, 654–57, 671–72 (7th Cir. 2014);
Lamparello, supra note 10, at 59–60; see also Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2623 (Roberts, C.J.,
dissenting) (arguing Justice Kennedy’s majority opinion in Obergefell failed to use the modern
Equal Protection Clause’s means-end methodology in favor of a vague argument that there is
“synergy” between that Clause and the Due Process Clause).
221. See Baskin, 766 F.3d at 654–72.
222. Id. at 656–57.
223. See Juliana, 217 F. Supp. 3d at 1249–50 (discussing Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2598).
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and are only invalid if they are reviewed under a strict scrutiny standard
pursuant to Justice Kennedy’s evolving due process analysis in Obergefell.224
Judge Aiken admitted that that the United States Government’s actions
approving permits for various types of fossil fuel extraction and burning
would pass rational basis review. 225 Thus, Judge Aiken in the Juliana
decision could not have used a rational basis analysis under the Equal
Protection Clause to create a new constitutional right to a livable climate
system.226
III. ALTERNATIVES TO ADDRESSING CLIMATE CHANGE WITHOUT
JUDICIAL INTERVENTION
Some commentators suggest that the human activities promoting
climate change are pushing the Earth’s environment to an “imminent”
catastrophic tipping point in which human society will be unable to prevent
catastrophic climate disaster.227 Some legal scholars argue that immediate
judicial intervention in climate policy is necessary because the United States
political system is unlikely to act in time.228 Thus, they support Judge Aiken’s
Juliana decision.229
Another view is that while climate change presents significant policy
issues, there is still time for new technologies such as renewable energy to
limit the total amount of possible global warming caused by fossil fuels.230
For example, a group of scientists led by Richard Millar of the University of
Oxford has determined that human society has roughly twenty years, until
about 2038, to limit global warming to a total increase of 1.5 degrees Celsius,
which would restrain the potential consequences of climate change.231 By
224. Id. at 1248–50.
225. Id. at 1248–49.
226. See id. at 1249–50.
227. See Michael Blumm & Mary Christina Wood, “No Ordinary Lawsuit,” Climate
Change, Due Process, and the Public Trust Doctrine, 67 AM. U. L. REV. 1, 39–41, 87 (2017);
R. Henry Weaver & Douglas A. Kysar, Courting Disaster: Climate Change and the
Adjudication of Catastrophe, 93 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 295, 296–97, 304–12, 355–56 (2017);
see also David Wallace-Wells, The Uninhabitable Earth, NYMAG.COM: DAILY
INTELLIGENCER (July 9, 2017), http://nymag.com/daily/intelligencer/2017/07/climate-changeearth-too-hot-for-humans.html [https://perma.cc/8KEY-BVDH] (arguing catastrophic climate
change has already begun to affect the Earth and will worsen).
228. Weaver & Kysar, supra note 227, at 296–97, 304–12, 354–56; Blumm & Wood,
supra note 227, at 87.
229. Weaver & Kysar, supra note 227, at 348; Blumm & Wood, supra note 227, at 62.
230. See Mank, supra note 1, at 862–63, 900.
231. Chris Mooney, New Climate Change Calculations Could Buy the Earth Some Time
— If They’re Right, WASH. POST (Sept. 18, 2017, 12:36 PM), https://www.washingtonpost.
com/news/energy-environment/wp/2017/09/18/new-climate-calculations-could-buy-theearth-some-time-if-theyre-right/?utm_term=.ce38c6bb48ff [https://perma.cc/DA27-ETHR]
(Millar’s study “finds that we have more than 700 billion tons [of carbon dioxide] left to emit
to keep warming within 1.5 degrees Celsius, with a two-thirds probability of success. ‘That’s
about 20 years [from 2017] at present-day emissions.’”).
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contrast, in October 2018, the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change
issued a special report suggesting that global warming would reach a total
increase of 1.5 degrees Celsius by 2030, although acknowledging that the
date could be as late as 2052.232 Because “climate is not so simple as to give
us a neat cutoff date for action,”233 there is a plausible argument for giving
Congress and the President the opportunity to address the problem of climate
change instead of giving courts novel and unprecedented authority in energy
policy questions that violates essential separation of powers doctrines in the
United States Constitution.234
Some readers may be sympathetic regarding Judge Aiken’s Juliana
opinion because of their concerns about the potential impacts of climate
change. Furthermore, some readers may strongly disapprove President
Trump’s 2017 disavowal of the Paris Climate Accord and think that judicial
intervention is required to avoid “imminent”235 climate catastrophe.236 Yet
there is great menace in permitting the judiciary to invoke an “evolving” Due
Process Clause to arrogate political and legislative powers to decide energy
policy questions.237 Rather, those who oppose President Trump’s withdrawal
from the Paris Climate Accord or general energy policies should exercise
their voting rights in the 2020 presidential election.
There are alternatives to judicial control of energy policy that are
legitimate under the United States Constitution. States and cities may
exercise their authority in our federalist system to adopt policies reducing
CO2 and GHGs to minimize the impacts of climate change. Numerous states,
cities, and private companies have announced plans for significant climate
change reduction actions in response to President Trump’s Paris Climate
Accord withdrawal.238 Furthermore, there is substantial evidence that
232. INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE, GLOBAL WARMING OF 1.5
6, 20 (2018), https://report.ipcc.ch/sr15/pdf/sr15_spm_final.pdf [https://perma.cc/3J
WD-7L2E].
233. Michael Marshall, Why It’s Misleading to Say We Only Have 12 Years to Avert
Dangerous Climate Change, FORBES (Oct. 8, 2018, 12:19 PM), https://www.forbes.com/
sites/michaelmarshalleurope/2018/10/08/why-its-misleading-to-say-we-only-have-12-yearsto-avert-dangerous-climate-change/#345ec0977806 [https://perma.cc/Q92J-Y53X].
234. See generally Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497, 535–36 (2007) (Roberts, C.J.,
dissenting) (arguing that climate change is a global political problem that should be decided
by the political branches and, therefore, is a nonjusticiable general grievance unsuitable for
resolution by the federal courts).
235. Imminent is a relative term. For the author, Bradford Mank, a human activity that
may cause harm to the environment is not imminent for the purposes of judicial intervention
if a current or future legislative or executive branch might take action to address climate
change issues without the need for an immediate judicial decision.
236. See, e.g., Michael Biesecker & Paul Wiseman, AP Fact Check: Trump’s Shaky
Claims on Climate Accord, AP NEWS (June 1, 2017), https://apnews.com/d4836217fa7b4d3
eadea33dd20ceff3c [https://perma.cc/4M34-9VQW] (“Announcing that the U.S. will
withdraw from the Paris climate accord, President Donald Trump misplaced the blame for
what ails the coal industry and laid a shaky factual foundation for his decision.”).
237. See supra Part II.
238. Mank, supra note 1, at 862.
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renewable energy efforts and more efficient electricity technologies are
significantly reducing and replacing carbon-intensive fossil fuels.239 If
renewable energy and more efficient electricity technologies are on a longterm direction to substitute carbon-intensive fossil fuels, it is unwise for the
Supreme Court to allow federal judges the discretion under the Due Process
Clause to grab the authority to make energy policies from the political
branches.240
CONCLUSION
In Juliana, the Ninth Circuit properly concluded that federal courts
may not usurp the policy judgments and discretion of the political branches
even if federal judges have doubts about the decisions of the Executive and
Congress.241 By holding that federal courts do not have the power to redress
the plaintiffs’ proposed remedy and that the plaintiffs therefore lacked
standing to sue, the Ninth Circuit was able to avoid addressing whether there
is a due process right to a livable climate system capable of sustaining human
life.242 Using a standing redressability analysis, the panel majority was able
to reach the same conclusion of the author that it is inappropriate in a
democratic system for judges to use injunctive relief to force the political
branches to make policy choices that a federal judge prefers. 243
Similar to the Ninth Circuit’s decision, both Judge Alsup in the City
of Oakland decision and Judge Diamond in the Clean Air Council decision
recognized that the political branches, Congress and the Executive Branch,
should decide climate change policy rather than federal courts.244
Additionally, the Alec L. decision, the Kanuk decision, and the Sanders-Reed
decision each appropriately acknowledged that administrative agencies have
more expertise than courts in addressing environmental issues, including
climate change.245 Furthermore, those three decisions all implied that the
separation of powers principles in the United States Constitution and state
constitutions assign executive agencies the authority to enforce
environmental laws and remedies rather than courts.246 While well meaning,
239. Mank, supra note 1, at 862–63, 900.
240. See supra Part II and Conclusion.
241. See supra Section I.G.
242. See supra Section I.G.
243. See supra Section I.G.
244. Clean Air Council v. United States, 362 F. Supp. 3d 237, 250–51 (E.D. Pa. 2019);
Order Granting Motion to Dismiss Amended Complaints at 15–16, City of Oakland v. BP
P.L.C., No. C17-06011 WHA, 2018 WL 3609055 (N.D. Cal. July 27, 2018).
245. Alec L. v. Jackson, 863 F. Supp. 2d 11, 15–16 (D.D.C. 2012), aff’d sub nom, Alec
L. ex rel. Loorz v. McCarthy, 561 Fed. Appx. 7, 8 (D.C. Cir. 2014)); Kanuk ex rel. Kanuk v.
State, Dep’t of Nat. Res., 335 P.3d 1088, 1097–103 (Alaska 2014); Sanders-Reed ex rel.
Sanders-Reed v. Martinez, 350 P.3d 1221, 1226–27 (N.M. Ct. App. 2015).
246. Sanders-Reed, 350 P.3d at 1226–27; see Kanuk, 335 P.3d at 1097–103 (citing
prudential grounds for dismissing public trust suit where political branches are better capable
than courts in deciding environmental policy questions).
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Judge Staton’s dissenting opinion in Juliana would authorize federal judges
to override the policy choices of the Executive and Congress whenever a
federal judge in their personal discretion decided that an “emergency” existed
and the judge was dissatisfied with the policy decisions of the political
branches.247 Rather than relying on judge-made law, we must place our hope
in our elected officials to reach bipartisan solutions to the issue of climate
change.248
This article uses a different analysis than the Ninth Circuit in
concluding that there is no due process right to a livable climate system
capable of sustaining human life in our country’s history and traditions,
although the article reaches the same end result that federal courts may not
override or impose energy policy choices against the wishes of the political
branches.249 Both Judge Edmunds in Lake v. City of Southgate and Judge
Diamond in the Clean Air Council decision pointed out that all courts but the
Juliana decision have consistently rejected a due process right to a healthy
environment.250 The essential reason for limiting the scope of substantive due
process to protecting the historically fundamental rights of individuals and
vulnerable minority groups is that a broad view of substantive due process,
such as Judge Aiken’s or Judge Staton’s, allows federal judges to override
the policy choices of the political branches if substantive due process is
malleable enough to reach every major policy decision such as climate and
energy policies.251 However, the Ninth Circuit’s use of standing
redressability to overrule Judge Aiken’s decision might have been the easier
way to preserve the separation of powers than the arguably more
controversial issue of how far Justice Kennedy’s evolving doctrine of
substantive due process in Obergefell extends beyond the issue of same-sex
marriage to quite different issues such as climate policy.252 The author
supports the Ninth Circuit’s decision even if the court avoided the due
process issue because the majority protected the separation of powers
principles in the U.S. Constitution and the policy choices of the political
branches.253

247. See supra Part I.G.
248. See Trumbull, supra note 23.
249. See supra Part II.
250. Clean Air Council v. United States, 362 F. Supp. 3d 237, 250–51 (E.D. Pa. 2019);
Lake v. City of Southgate, No. 16-10251, 2017 WL 767879, at *3–4 (E.D. Mich. Feb. 28,
2017).
251. See supra Section I.G and Part II.
252. See supra Section I.G and Part II.
253. See supra Section I.G.

